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Summar, findings
Except for two relatively minor statutes, U.S.  the number of lives saved, the more likely the EPA was
environmental laws do not permit the balancing of costs  to ban their use.
and benefits in setting environmental standards. The  *  But thie  amount the EPA was (implicitly) willing to
Clean Air Act, for example, prohibits the Environmental  spend to save a life was high: $52 million to prevent
Protection Agency (EPA)  from considering costs in  cancer among pesticide applicators, and $49 million to
setting ambient air quality standards. Similarly, the Clean  avoid cancer through exposure to asbestos.
Water Act does not allow consideration of benefits in  *  The value the EPA attached to saving a life was
setting effluent standards. When the EPA  is allowed to  higher for workers than for consumers. The value
balance benefits against costs, it has considerable  attached to avoiding a case of cancer through exposure
discretion  in defining "balancing."  to pesticide residues on food was less than  $100,000, in
Van Houtven  and Cropper ask two questions:  contrast with the $52 million value of preventing cancer
Whether allowed to or not, has the EPA balanced costs  among pesticide applicators  perhaps because workers
and benefits in setting environmental standards? Where  are exposed to higher levels of pollution than consumers.
has the EPA drawn the line in deciding how much to  *  After 1987, when the Natural Resources Defense
spend to save a statistical life?  Council sued the EPA for considering costs in setting
Their answers are based on data about the costs and  ermissions  standards for vinyl chloride, the El t.
benefits of regulations involving three classes  of  considered costs in setting emissions standards only after
pollutants:  cancer-c- ising pesticides used or  food crops  an acceptable level of risk was achieved.
(1975-89);  carcinogenic air pollutants  (1975-90);  and  *  Ironically, before the vinyl chloride decision, the
all uses of asbestos regulated under the Toxic Substances  value per cancer case avoided was only $15 million. The
Control A.t. These ace their findings, in brief:  amount the EPA  was willing to spend to save a life was
The EPA behaved as though it were balancing costs  thus less under the Clean Air Act than under the
and benefits in its regulation of pesticides under FIFRA  balancing statutes. But after this decision, the EPA  did
and of asbestos under TSCA, the two so-called balancing  not consider costs at all if the risk of cancer to the
statutes. The higher the cost of the ban, the less likely the  maximally exposed individual was above one in 10,000.
EPA was to ban the use of these products. The greater
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Developing  countries, when writing Environmental  Action Plans, can leam much from
the  United States experience in  regulating environmental risks.  A  notable feature of
environmental  legislation  in the U.S. is that, with the exception  of two relatively  minor statutes,
environmental  laws do not permit the balancing  of benefits and costs in setting  environmental
standards.  In the Clean Air Act, for example, EPA is prohibited from considering costs in
setting ambient air quality standards.  Similarly, benefits are not to be considered in setting
effluent  standards  under the Clean Water Act.  When  EPA il allowed  to balance  benefits against
costs, it is given considerable  discretion  in defining what is meant by 'balancing".  This is the
case under the Federal Insecticide,  Fungicide and Rodenticide  Act (FIFRA), wilich governs
pesticide use, and the Toxic Substances  Control Act (TSCA), which controls the use and
manufacture  of toxic substances.
We ask two questions  in this paper:
(1) Whether  allowed to  or  not,  has EPA balanced benerits and costs  in  setting
environmental standards?
(2) Where has EPA drawn the line In deciding how iruch spend to save a statistical
life?
To answer these question  we have gathered  data on the benefits and costs of regulations
involving  three classes of pollutants:
(1)  all cancer-causing  pesticides used on food crops that went through EPA's  Special
Review  program between 1K75  and 1989;
(2)  all  carcinogenic air pollutants for which EPA set National Emissions Standards
(NESHAPs)  between 1975 and 1990;
(3) all uses of asbestos regulated  under the Toxic Substances  Control Act.
In each case the substances  regulated are carcinogens, so that we have quantitative
estimates  of the benefits  of each  regulation  (i.e., the number  of lives saved), as well as the costs.
[All estimates  are provided by EPA.]  Using modern statistical  techniques  we have, for each
class of regulations, estimated a model to explain the decisions  issued.  Since each class of
regulations  saves lives, we have  also estimated  a threshold  value-per-statistical-life-saved  above
which EPA was unlikely  to issue a regulation.ii
Our findings are as follo  s:
1.  EPA behaved as though it was balancing benefits and costs in its regulation of
pesticides  under FIFRA and of asbestos under TSCA, the two balancing  statutes. The agency
was less likely to ban a use of asbestos (or of a pesticide)  the higher the cost of the ban.  It was
more likely to ban a use of a pesticide (or of asbestos)  the greater the number of lives saved.
2.  The amount that EPA was (implicitly)  willing  to spend to save a life was, however,
high: The value of avoiding  a case of cancer  among  pesticide  applicators  was $52 million  (1989
dollars), while  the value of avoiding  a cancer case through  exposure  to asbestos  was $49 million
(1989 dollars).  When asked to balance the benefits of regulation  against the cost, EPA has,
implicitly,  been willing to spend considerable  sums to save a human  life.
3.  The value attpched to saving a life was, moreover, higher for workers than for
consumers.  The value attached to avoiding a case of cancer through exposure to pesticide
resid,aes  on food was less than $100,000, in contrast to the $52 million value of avoiding  a
cancer case among  pesticide  applicators. A possible  explanation  for this is the fact that workers
are, on average, exposed to much higher levels of poliution  than consumers. It is  also more
likely that occupational  cancers can be traced to a particular  pollutant  than can non-occupational
cancers.
4.  With regard to emissions  standards  for hazardous  air pollutants,  issued under a non-
balancing  statue, EPA  acted as though  it had considered  both the number  of canter cases  avoided
and regulatory costs in issuing regulations  prior to 1987.  In that year, it was sued by the
Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  an environmental  advocacy  group, for considering  costs in
setting  emis.ions standards for Vinyl Chloride. After the Vinyl Chloride  decision, the agency
considered  costs in setting  emissions  standards  only once an acceptable  level of individual  risk
was achieved.
5.  Ironically, prior to the Vinyl Chlorid  decision the value per cancer case avoided
implied by the NESHAPs  was only $15 million (1989  dollars).  The amount EPA was willing
to spend to save a life was thus less under the Clean Air Act than under the so-called  balancing
statutes. After this decision, however, EPA did not consider  costs at all if the risk of cancer to
the maximally  exposed  individual  was above 1 in 10,000.
These findings  raise two questions. The first is obvious: Are the amounts  spent  to save
a life under the regulations  studied here acceptable  to citizens in the U.S.?  The second is:
Should  these amount be made more explicit in order to encourage  public debate on health and
safety regulation? To the authors, the answer to the second question  is undoubtedly  'yes".WHEN IS A LEFE  TOO COSTLY TO SAVE?
TIF  EV!DENCE FROM U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATIONS
1.  Introduction
Under  various environmental  statutes  the U. S. Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)
is responsible for issuing regulations  to protect the public from exposure to pollution. These
;  dions include outright bans of certain products (some pesticides, products containing
asbestos)  and, more commonly,  limitations  on the amount of pollution a factory or vehicle can
emit.
Most economists  would  argue that these regulations  should  be made--at  least in part-- on
the basis of benefit-cost  analyses: an environmental  standard should  be set where the marginal
r,ost  of setting a slightly more stringent  standard outweighs  the marginal benefit of increased
stringency. EPA, however, is sometimes  restricted  by Congress  in what factors it can consider
in issuing  iegulations. For example, under those  provisions  of the Clean Air Act pertaining  to
ambient standard-setting,  costs cannot be taken into account, whereas for effluent standards
under the Clean Water Act,  costs are  to be considered but benefits are  not.  Only two
environmental  statutes--the  Federal Insecticide,  Fungicide  and Rodenticide  Act (FIFRA)  and the
Toxic Substances  Control Act (TSCA)--actually  require  that the benefits  and costs of regulation
be balanced in setting environmental  standards.
In this paper we investigate whether EPA has balanced costs and benefits in issuing
regulations,  regardless  of whether  it is allowed to do so by law.  Our definition  of "balancing"
is as follows. If we examine  a class of EPA regulations--for  example, emissions standards  for
toxic air pollutants--do  variations in costs and benefits acro4s  possible regulatory  options helpexplain  the standards  selected?  We shall  conclude  that EPA  has taken both costs  and benefits  into
consideration  if (other things equal) a more costly standard  is less likely to be selected, and a
standard that saves more lives is more likely to be selezted.
Intuitively, however, balancing  requires more than this.  !t requires that the cost EPA
is willing  to incur to save an additional  life be *reasonable". For each class of regulations  that
we examine, we calculate  the implicit  cost that  EPA is willing to incur to save an additional  life-
-the value of a statistical  life implied by the regulatuons. The most important  question is how
this value compares with society's apparent willingness  to pay to  save the lives of people
exposed to pollution:  Is the value of a statistical life implicit in environmental  regulations
acceptable?  It is also important  to ask how this value varies across EPA program offices  and
across population  groups.  Is the value of a life saved higher for pesticide  regulations  than for
air toxics? Does the agency  implicitly  attach more  weight  to saving  the life of a worker  exposed
to pesticides  or asbestos on the job than to the life of a consumer  exposed  to these pollutants?
A related issue that we examine is howv  EPA balances high risks to a relatively small
number of  individuals  against smaller risks to larger populations. The definition  of life-saving
benefits used by economists--the  expected  number of iives saved in a population--implies  that
population risk is the regulatory  outcome of interest.  Much of environmental  regulation is,
however, based on the notion of reducing  individual  risk to an acceptable  level. The notion  of
risk equity requires that risk of death to the person who is most highly exposed  to a pollutant
(the so-called 'maximally exposed  individual"  or MEI) be reasonable.  One of the issues we
examine is how much weight EPA has given to individual  risk versus population  risk in its
regulations.3
To address these topics, we have gathered  data on the costs and benefits associated  with
three categories  of pollutants that the agency regulates:
(1)  all cancer-causing  pesticides  used on food crcps that went through  EPA's Special
Review  process between 1975 and 1989;
(2)  all uses of asbestos  regvlated  under the Toxic Substances  Control Act (TSCA);
(3)  all carcinogenic  air puolutants  for which EPA set National Emissions  Standards
(NESHAPs)  between 1975 and 1990.
!-  each case, data were gathered for each source of the pollutant (each crop in the case of
pesticides),  giving us a total of 245 pesticide  regulations,  39 sources  of asbestos  regulated  under
TSCA  and 40 sources  of four hazardous  air pollutants--benzene,  inorganic  arsenic, radionuclides
and vinyl chloride.
Our study is limited  to the regulation  of carcinogens  because  quantitative  risk data are
available more often for carcinogens  than for other substances. This implies that the benefits
of the regulation  (the number  of lives saved)  can be quantified. We have also purposely  selected
some regulations issued under the  two balancing statutes-TSCA and FIFRA-as  well as
regulations  issued  under the Clean Air Act (the setting  of emissions  standards  fer hazardous  air
pollutants)  to see whether  the enabling  legisladon  makes  any difference  in the way  in which  EPA
ualances  benefits and costs.
For each class of pollutants  we estimate  a model  to explain  EPA's regulatory  decisions.
Section  II of the paper presents  a model o explain whether  EPA banned  or did not ban each of
the 39 uses of asbestos  considered for zegulation  under TSCA.  In section III a similar model
is estimated  to explain EPA's decision to ban or not ban a pesticide (e.g., alachlor) for use on4
ai particular crop (e.g., corn).  In the catse  of hazardous  air pollutants,  the model presented  in
section IV explains why EPA selected  the regulatory  option that it did out of all the options
considered for regulating  each source of the  pollutant. Section V presents  our conclusions.
I.  Asbestos Regulations Under TSCA
In 1985  EPA announced  its intent to ba;i the use of asbestos in 39 products under the
Toxic Substances  Control Act.  Because I  . sA  is a balancing  statute, EPA's Notice of Intent
to Regulate was followed  by a detailed assessment  of the riskl of exposure  to asbestos fibers,
as well as the costs of the ban (USEPA  1989).
There is well-documented  epidemiological  evidence (as well as support from animal
studies) indicating that some forms of  asbestos are  hum-n carcinngens.  This evidence is
particularly strong for lung cancei, gastrointestinal  cancer and mesothelioma,  a cancer of the
lung or abdominal  lining.  Estimating  the numbcr of cancer cases associated  with a particular
asbestos-containing  product (e.g., brakes lined with asbestos)  requires estima'es of the potency
of asbestos--the  likelihood  of developing  cancer as a function of asbestos exposure-as well as
an estimate of exposure--the  number  of fibers inhaled as a result of using the product.  In the
Regulatory Impact Analysis  accompanying  EPA's final rule, the agency presented, for each
product, exposure  estimates  (in millions  of fibers  inhaled  per year)  for various groups  of workers
and for consumers, as well as the number of cancer cases associated  wits each source of
asbestos. Table 1 presents EPA's estimates,  on a product-by-product  basis, of the number  of
cancer cases that would be avoided if each product were banned in  1992.  EPA was able to
estimate these, and zhe cost of the ban, for 31 of the 39 products considered for regulation.5
Estimates  of cancer cases avoided  are based on 13 years  of exposure, since the agency  assumed
that asbestos would be phased out of these products after a 13-year  period.  Two points about
these estimates  are worth noting. First, the agency made no distinction  as to when the cancer
ccses would  occur.  Estimates  by Mauskopf  (1987)  suggest  that 50 percent of the cancer cases
listed in Table 1  would occur between  2025 and 2054, while 30 percent would  occur after 2054,
due to the long latency period associated  with asbestos.  Second,  in estimating  the number of
cancer casea avoided by banning asbestos, EPA assumed  that all substitutes for asbestos were
riskless, an assumption  of dubious  validity.'
To calculate the costs of the ban, EPA estimated the lost consumer-plus-produccr
surplus that would result if alternatives  to asbestos were used.  Columi 2 of Table 1 presents
estimates  of these losses, discounted  at 3 percent. 2 The cost per life saved (column  2 divided
by column 1) appears in column 3.
A.  The Value of A Cancer  Case  Avoided
A plot of regulatory costs and cancer cases avoided for the 31 products for which
complete  data are available (see Figure 1) suggests that EPA indeed considered benefits and
costs in issuing the asbestos  decision:  Products  in the northwest  corner of Figure 1, showing
'Because  our goal is to capture the information  available  to the agency at the time of
each decision,  we use official  agency estimates  of risks and benefits, even when these do not
accurately  measurt;  the risk reduction  associated  with the ban, or the social costs of the ban.
2It is EPA's ni±tctice  to discount the costs of a regulation  but not the benefits. Such a
practice is difficult  to justify, and was, in part, responsible  for the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals  overturning  the regulations  examined  in this section (Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947
F. 2d at 1218.)6
low costs and high numbers  of lives  saved,  are almost  always  banned,  while  products  in the
southeast  corner, with high costs  and low numbers  of lives waved  are, for the most part, not
banned.
Since  cancer  cases  avoided  are the  only  benefits  of the asbestos  ban  mentioned  by EPA
(i.e., ecological  risks  were not a factor  in the decision  to ban asbestos-containing  products),  it
is tempting  to infer  from Figure  1 a threshold  value  of a cancer  case  avoided  below  which  all
products  were  banned. The two solid  lines  in Figure  1 correspond  to values  of a statistical  life
of $10  million  and  $100  million  dollarc,  respectively.  Clearly,  neither  line fits  the  data  perfectly:
The rules 'ban all prcducts  with cost per life saved  ratios below  $10 million  ($100  million)
dollars' yield  incorrect  prWdictions  for some  products.
To compute  the threshold  value of a cancer  case avoided  implied  by the asbestos
regulations  we  estimate  a probit  model  that  predicts  the probability  that  asbestos  was  banned  for
use in eadi product. Formally,  we assume  that the use of asbestos  is banned  in product i  if
the value  of the cancer  cases  avoided  (aM;  ) minus  the  cost  of the ban (bCi,  b < 0) are positive,
aM, t  bC, > 0.  (1)
This  is equivalent  to banning  asbestos  in product i if the cost  per life  saved,  C/M,, falls  below
-a/b, which  is the ;hreshold  value  of a cancer  case  avoided.
Since  equation  (1) does  not fit the data  perfectly,  we estimate  equation  (2),
P(Banj)  = P(aM + bCi + u;  ,  (2)7
whe.,  u,  is an error term that captures  other factors,  e.g., political  considerations,  that
influenced  the decision.
When  equation  (2) is estimated  using  the data  in Table  1, coefficients  a  and b  are
statistically  significant  (see  column  I of Table  2), and the implied  threshold  value  of a cancer
case avoided  is $49 million  (1989  dollars).
It is interesting  to contrast  this  threshold  with  the  average  cost  per cancer  case  avoided.
In the BRgullmz  Btl  Qf  the United  S=a,  the Office.  of Management  and Bidget (OMB
1993)  frequently  lists  various  health  and  safety  regulations  in order  of their  average  cost  per life
saved. The  regulations  with  the highest  cost  per life  saved  are often  environmental  regulations.
It is  clear  from  Table  1  that,  by focusing  on  automatic  transmissicn  components,  with  az average
mst per cancer  case  avoided  of $500  million,  OMB  could  make  EPA's  asbestos  regulations  look
bad.  We believe  that a more accurate  description  of the regulations  is the thrshold value
computed  in Table  2.
A value  of $49 million  per life saved  is, nonetheless,  high-especially  in contrast  to
estimates  of the value of a statistical  life based on willingness  to pay for risk reductions.
Estimates  of the value  of a statistical  life bawd on compensating  wage  differentials  (Fisher,
Violette, and Chestnut 1989; Viscusi 1992) suggest that workers in risky jobs require
compensation  on the order  of $5  million  per statistical  life. While  this  compensation  is for risks
that are voluntarily  borne, it is hard to imagine  that the additional  pr-emium  associated  with
involuntary  risks  is $44 million.
The threshold  value  of life implied  by the asbestos  regulations  may, in fact, be higher
than $49 million  for three  reasons. As noted  above,  EPA  failed  to acknowledge  the timing  of8
cancer cases avoided, even though it discounted  the costs of the ban.  If all cancer cases were
avoided in 10 years rather than today, and if these cases were discounted  at a rate of 3 percent,
the threshold  value estimated  in Table 2 wouli rise to $65 million  (1989  dollars). The threshold
value is also biased downward  because EPA ignored the risks of asbestos substitutes,  and thus
overstated  the risk reduction that vould follow a ban.  Finally, many believe that EPA's risk
assessment  methodology  results in "maximum  plausible  upper bound" estimates  of risk.  This
implie. that the expted  number  of cancer cases avoided  is smaller than the numbers  in Table
1 and, therefor, that the value of a cancer case avoided is larger.
Both of these factors were considered  by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Corrosion  Proof Fittings  case. 3 In this case, which overturned  the asbestos  ban, the court ruled
that EPA had failed to take account  of the timing  of lives saved, and had ignored  the health  risks
of asbestos substitutes.  It was also determined that EPA had given insufficient  weight to
regulatory  costs.  In other words, the costs of the asbestos  ban were too high relative to the
benefits.
B.  Occupational v. Non-Occupational Exposure
In Table 1 no distinction  is made between cancer cases that result from occupational
exposure  to asbestos  and those that do not.'  Because  workers  are, in general,  exposed  to higher
3Corrosion  Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218.
'Although the Departmenit  of Labor's Occupational  Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)  traditionally  has the task of regulating  worker exposure to toxic substances,  EPA
has the responsibility  for regulating  occupational  exposures  to pesticides  and to toxic
substances  that tall under the jurisdiction of the Toxic Substances  Control Act.9
levels of asbestos than consumers, EPA may weight worker risks differently from consumer
Aisks  in deciding  which products  to ban.  Equation  (2) is easily modified  to distinguish  between
occupational  and non-occupational  cancer cases avoided.  Letting M,,  represent occupational
cancer cases avoided and  M 21 non-occupational  cancer cases, (2) becomes
P(Ban;)  - P(a 1M,j + a2M 2N + bC; + ui >  0).  (3)
The ratios of the coefficients  - al/b  and - a2/b  measure, respectively, the value that EPA
attaches  to each type of cancer case.  The corresponding  geometric  interpretation,  if one plots
C, Ml and M 2 in three dimensions,  is that EPA will ban all products  whose cost falls below the
plane Z =  -a1/bM,i -a2/bM 2 i.
Unfortunately,  reductions  in occupational  and non-occupational  cancer cases  are highly
correlated.  This is reflected in the second column of Table 2,  which shows the effect of
separating  cancer cases avoided into the two categories. While higher values of each benefit
variable significantly increase the  chances that a  product is  banned,  neither variable is
statistically  significant  at conventional  levels.  It is, nonetheless, interesting  to note that tie
coefficient  of occupational  incidence  reduction  is about  twice the coefficient  of non-occupational
incidence  reduction. These coefficients  imply, respectively,  values per cancer case avoided  of
$71 million  and $34 million.
EPA's  tendency to  value reductions in  occupational  exposures more highly than
reductions in  non-occupational  exposures is  confirmed below, in  our analysis of pesticide
regulations.  The result is not surprising for two reasons.  First, workers are, on average,10
exposed to much higher levels of asbestos than consumers. It is certainly  reasonable  that risk
reductions be valued more highly, the higher is baseline  risk.'  Second,  workers constitute  an
identified group, whose deaths from cancer are more easily linked to a  specific source of
exposure than are the deaths of consumers. In this sense the cost of not regulating  ("making  a
mistake") is potentially  higher for workers than for consumers.
On the other hand, to the extent that workers may already receive compensating  wage
differentials for exposure to asbestos, and, to the extent that their exposure is more voluntary
than consumers', it is hard to justify the higher weight assigned to reducing occupational
exposures.
MIi. Pesticide Regulatlons Under FIRA
Under FIFRA, EPA is responsible  for insuring that all pesticides  used in the United
States do not have "unreasonable  adverse  effects on the environment." If EPA suspects that a
pesticide poses risks to human health or to ecosystems,  the pesticide--or,  more accurately,  the
active ingredients  used in the pesticide--are  subject  to a Special  keview. 6 This entails a formal
risk-benefit  analysis of the pesticide,  after which EPA can either ban the pesticide for use on
'In the game of Russian Roulette, an individual  is certainly  willing to pay more to
remove the first of six bullets from the chamber  of a gun than he is willing to pay to remove
the last bullet.
'In the 1972 amendments  to FIFRA, EPA was given the task of reregistering  the 50,000
pesticides in use in the United  States at that time.  In the 1978  amendments  to FIFRA, this
task was simplified  by requiring reregistration  of the 600 active ingredients  used in the
pesticides.11
specific  crops, restrict the manner  in which  the pesticide  is applied,  or allow its continued  use,
without modification.
Between 1975, when EPA initiated  its first Special Review, and December  of  1989,
Special Reviews were completed for 37 active ingredients.  Our analysis is restricted to the
subset of these active ingredients  that are suspected  human carcinogens. Since, in principle,
EPA can ban the use of an active ingredient  on one crop but not on another, the number of
possible  regulations  that can be issued  for each active ingredient  is equal to the number  of crops
on which the active ingredient  is used. As shown  in Table 3, the 19 active  ingredients  examined
were registered for use on a total of 245 food crops.  We have restricted the analysis to food
crops so that estimates  of dietary cancer risk are available, as well as risk of cancer to mixers
and applicators  of pesticides.
In considering whether or not to ban a pesticide, EPA examines risks of cancer to
persons occupationally  exposed to the pesticide--pesticide  mixers and loaders and pesticide
applicators-as well as to consumers  of pesticide residues  on food.  Non-cancer  health risks--
risks of miscarriages  or of possible  fetal  damage--are  also examined. In addition, EPA  considers
adverse  effects  of pesticide  exposure  to fish, birds and mammals. Against  the risks of pesticide
use, EPA is to balance  the benefits  of use-the reduction  in consumer  and producer  surpluses  that
would result if the pesticide  were banned. 7
7In practice, consumer  surpluses  are rarely computed. Instead, the benefit  of pesticide
use are measured  as the cost of switching  to substitute  products, plus the value of resulting
yield losses.  These are usually  quantified  only for the first year after the proposed ban, and
thus overstate the losses that would  occur if better substitutes  were developed  for the banned
pesticide.12
Table 4 contains  the means  and standard  deviations  of risk and benefit  variables  for 245
pesticide-crop combinations, separated according to  whether or  not  the combination was
eventually banned.'  Cancer risk measures  the number of cancer cases, per million exposed
workers or consumers, that are likely to develop as the result of a lifetime  of exposure to the
pesticide.' These numbers  thus represent  the average  risk to an individual  worker or consumer,
and must be multiplied  by the size of the exposed  population  to calculate  the number  of cancer
cases that would result from pesticide exposure." 0 Since data on the size of the exposed
population  are not always  reported, we treat the size of the exposed  mixer/loader,  applicator  and
consumer populations as  constant across crop/pesticide combinations.  The  mixer/loader
population  is assumed  to be 1,000  workers, the applicator  population  10,000  workers, while the
relevant population  for calculating  dietary risks is the entire U.S. population.
Evidence of reproductive risks (risk of  fetal deformity, lowered sperm count, or
increased risk of miscarriage)  are measured  by a dummy  variable, as are risks to marine life.
EPA also distinguishes  risks to birds and mammals; however, if an active ingredient harms
mammals (birds), it always harms marine life.  The same 'subsetting' problem occurs if an
active ingredient is a mutagen or a teratogen; i.e.,  a substance  that is a mutagen (teratogen)
necessarily  causes adverse reproductive  effects.
'AU  data were obtained from official  Position  Documents  that accompanied  EPA's Notice
of Final Determination.
'The measurement  of risks and benefits is discussed  in more detail in Cropper et al.
(1992a).
t To illustrate, if dietary cancer risk is 1 cancer case per million  exposed  persons, and
the size of the exposed  population  is 250 million, we would  expect to observe  250 cancer
cases in the exposed  population.13
The benefits of pesticide use are measured as producer losses in the first year after
cancellation,  as reported by EPA.  All benefits are in 1986  dollars.  When benefit data are
missing,  a dummy  variable  is used to indicate  whether  yield losses are predicted  to occur if the
pesticide is banned.
A.  A Model of Pesticide  Regulation
It is tempting to plot the cost of pesticide bans against the number of cancer cases
avoided,  as was done for asbestos regulations  (see Figure 1); however, such a diagram would
be misleading  here.  Because there are benefits to banning a pesticide besides cancer cases
avoided, the threshold inferred from such a  diagram would overstate the value that EPA
implicitly  attaches  to reducing  cancer risks.
A better approach is to extend the probit model of equation (3) to include non-ancer
benefits,  and to use the resulting  coefficients  to infer the value  attached  to avoiding  a cancer case
for each of the three population  groups.  To estimate such a  model we must confront the
problem of missing data.  As Table 4 indicates, data on cancer risks to the three groups of
interest are  sometimes missing--either  because estimates of  exposure are  not available, or
because there are insufficient  toxicological  studies  to quantify  the potency of the chemical. In
these cases we enter a  zero for the risk variable, but  include a  missing data dummy to
distinguish  these cases from instances  where the actual risk estimate is zero.  The coefficient  of
each cancer risk variable therefore measures  the effect of cancer risk, assuming  that risk data
are available.14
A probit model that predicts the probability of a pesticide ban appears in the first
column of Table 5.  The model  suggests  that EPA has considered  both the risks and benefits  of
pesticide use in issuing regulations.  The benefits of pesticide  use, which measure the cost of
the regulation,  are significant  and of the expected  sign: the higher the benefits  of pesticide  use,
the less likely it is that a pesticide is banned.  The absence of benefit data also reduces the
likelihood  that a pesticide is banned, regardless  of whether the ban will reduce crop yields.
The benefits of pesticide regulation  are also important  in explaining  which uses of a
pesticide are banned and which are not.  To EPA, the benefits of banning a pesticide are
equivalent  to the risks associated  with its use, since alternatives  to the pesticide are, in effect,
assumed  riskless. Other things equal, higher risks of cancer to pesticide  applicators--the  group
with the highest average exposure--significantly  increase the probability that a  pesticide is
banned. The value of a cancer  case avoided  among  applicators  is $45.58  million  (1986 dollars).
When converted to 1989 dollars this figure--S51.51  million--is  remarkably close to the value
obtained from asbestos regulations,  although  it is estimated  with less precision.  (The standard
error for the estimate (in 1989 dollars) is $30.22 million.]
What is perhaps  surprising  is that neither  risks  to mixer/loaders  of pesticides  nor dietary
risks are significant  in explaining  pesticide  decisions. Elsewhere  (Cropper et al. 1992a;  1992b)
we  have  modified the  model estimated here  to  include comments by  affected parties
environmental  advocacy  groups, grower organizations)  on the decision to ban a pesticide. We
note that, while such modifications  increase  the predictive  power  of the model, they do not alter
the lack of significance  of risks to mixer/loaders. Likewise,  dietary cancer  cases avoided,  while15
sometimes  significant  in explaining  the decision  to ban a pesticide,  always have an implied  value
below $100,000."1
The lack of significance  of risks to mixer/loaders  can, perhaps, be explained  by the
large proportion  of missing  observations  (69%)  for this variable. The negligible  value attached
to avoiding  dietary cancer cases is harder to explain. While one would expect this value to be
lower than the corresponding  value for applicators, based on differences  in baseline risk, one
would not necessarily expect the value to be so small.  One possible explanation is that
regulators  discount estimates  of dietary risk due to the conservative  way in which estimates  of
dietary exposure  are calculated. For example, EPA estimates  that 200 cancer cases occur each
year as a result of eating macadamia  nuts spraye  I with benomyl, while an additional  200 cases
are caused  by ingesting  almonds  sprayed  with the fungicide. These very large numbers  assume
that  benomyl  residues  will remain  on the nuts at the maximum  levels allowed  by law, whereas,
in fact, most residues  disappear  by the time the product is eaten.
B.  Individual v. Population Risk
While economists  typically  measure mortality  benefits by the number of lives that a
regulation  saves, the language  of environmental  statutes  often  refers to the concept  of acceptable
risk-the notion that no individual  should  have to bear a large risk of death from any one source.
Some  observers  of environmental  regulation  (Travis  et al. 1987  ) have  gone so far as to suggest
"It is interesting  to note that lack of risk data for either dietary or mixer risks
significantly  reduces the probability  that a pesticide  is banned, suggesting  that the  burden of
proor  falls on EPA to prove that a health risk exists.16
that EPA balances risks and benefits in issuing regulations  only if the level of risk to any one
individual  is below an acceptable  level.
To test this hypothesis  against  the alternative  theory that balancing  occurs at all levels
of individual  risk--the hypothesis  implicit  in the probit models  of equations  (2) and (3)
--we estimated  the model
P(Ban)  1  if  R 1 >  RAi forany  i,
(4)
P(Ban)  Eq. (3)  if  RA; <  R;, for all i.
where  Ru  denotes the level of acceptable risk for group  i.  Equation (4) implies that a
pesticide is banned for use on a particular crop if individual  risk to any one group exceeds the
acceptable  level for that group.
Maximum  likelihood  estimates  of equation (4) appear in the second column of Table
5.  The level of acceptable  risk for applicators is quite high:  Only if lifetime  cancer risk to
applicators  exceeds 1 in 100 does the model  predict that a pesticide will be banned, regardless
of cost.  The corresponding  acceptable  risk levels for mixer/loaders  and consumers  are much
lower--3 in 100,000 for mixer/loaders  and 2 in 10,000 for consumeiZ. Below acceptable  risk
levels, risks and benefits are both significant  in explaining  the likelihood  that a pesticide is
banned, and the implied value per applicator cancer case avoided is $47.46 million (1989
dollars).17
A test of the conventional  probit model against the acceptable  risk model, however;
indicates  that the probit model  cannot be rejected at either the 1 percent or 5 percent levels." 2
The notion of acceptable risk does not, therefore, provide a better explanation  of pesticide
regulations  than a conventional  probit model which assumes lives saved and  regulatory  costs
are balanced  at all levels of individual  risk.
IV.  National EFmisIons  Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
In contrast to regulations issued under TSCA and FIFRA, the National Emissions
Standards  for Hazardous  Air Pollutants  (NESHAPs)  were, according  to the 1970  Clean Air Act
(CAA),  to be F'-t  to protect  human  health, without  considering  costs. As we shall see, however,
EPA did consider  costs in setting emissions  standards  for sources of air toxics, at least before
1987. In 1987 the agency  was successfully  sued by the Natural Resources  Defense  Council  for
that interpretation. The ruling in this case, as demonstrated  below, had a pronounced  effect on
EPA's subsequent  setting of standards  for air toxics.
Section 112 of the CAA requires EPA to regulate the so-called toxic air pollutants-
substances such as  benzene, arsenic, asbestos and mercury.  These pollutants are  not as
ubiquitous  as the  criteriaw  pollutants (e.g., particulates,  sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide)  for
which EPA is to set ambient  air quality  standards,  but are nonetheless  harmful to human  health.
According  to the 1970  CAA, EPA was first to establish  a list of toxic air pollutants  and then to
set emissions  limits for various sources  of each pollutant. Between  1970 and 1990  only 7 such
'Me  likelihood  ratio test statistic  is 7.80.  The critical value of the chi-squared
distribution  at the .05 level of significance  is 7.82.18
substances were regulated--asbestos,  beryllium, mercury, v'nyl chloride,.  benzene, inorganic
arsenic  and radionuclides. Five of these  are carcinogens,  but quantitative  risk data are available
for only four--vinyl  chloride, benzene, inorganic  arsenic  and radionuclides. It is the regulation
of these substances  that we examine.
Table 6 lists the various sources of vinyl chloride, benzene, inorganic arsenic and
radionuclides  that EPA sought to regulate.  In each case, the agency considered at leavt one
regulatory  opdon that would  reduce emissions  of the toxic pollutant,  as well as the option  of no
regulation. For each option, the agency  computed  the cost of the option, the number  of cancer
cases that would occur if the option were chosen, and the post-regulation  maximum  individual
risk (MIR).  The latter measures  the risk to the maximally  exposed  individual-the person who
receives the greatest dose of pollutant from the source.  For most sources of air toxics this is
not a worker who is occupationally  exposed,  but rather a resident  who lives near the source; for
example, the person whose house is nearest to a copper or lead smelter."
One of the distinguishing  features of toxic air pollutants,  as opposed to the so-called
"criteria" (or common) air pollutants, is that they are not as widespread: They tend to pose
large risks to a few individuals  rather than  small risks to many  people. The notion  of maximum
individual  risk captures this aspect o. air toxics.
To see the importance of maximum individual risk versus population risk in  the
regulation of air toxics, Figure 2 plots, for each source, the level of maximum  individual  risk
(lifetime risk of cancer to the MEI) and annual cancer cases that would have occurred in the
"Maximum individual  risk is quite different from the measure of individual  risk
computed  in pesticide  regulations. The latter is based on averge  rather than upon maximum
exposure to the pollutant.19
absence of regulation. Recall that, in the case of pesticides,  a pesticide was always banned if
dietary risk exceeded 1.7 in 10,000.  Figure 2 indicates that sources of air toxics were neve
regulated  unless maximum  individual  risk exceeded 1 in 10,000.  This suggests that the level
of acceptable  risk was considerably  higher for air toxics than for pesticides.
To examine  the trade off between benefits  and costs in the regulation  of air toxics we
estimated  a multinomial  logit model.  Specifically,  we assumed that the utility of regulatory
option i  was a function  of the reduction  in cancer cases from choosing  option i  (rather than
doing nothing), M,, and the cost of the option (compared  to doing nothing), C 1,
UI-  aM1+  bC +  e;  (5)
In equation (5)  e;  represents  unmeasured  costs and benefits of the regulatory option.  The
model  assumes  that the regulatory  option  is selected  that yields  the highest  utility; thus the option
with the highest  Ui  is selected  assuming  Ui  is positive.  If  Ui  is negative for all  i, no
regulation  is undertaken.
The results of estimating  the multinomial  logit model  suggest  that EPA in fact balanced
cancer incidence  reduction against  cost.  When the model is estimated  using all 40 sources of
air toxics (see  column 1 of Table 7), the coefficients  of both cancer incidence  reductior and cost
are significant  at the .05 level. The implied  value per cancer case avoided is, however, high--
$153 million (1989 dollars).
These results, however,  are somewhat  misleading,  as they  fail to distinguish  regulations
Lsued before and after the Vinyl  Chlorid decision. In 1987,  the U.S. Court of Appeals  for the20
District of Columbia, in what has come to be known as the Xin4 Chlod&riedecision,'4  ruled
that EPA had improperly considered costs in setting the NESHAPs.  EPA was directed to
consider costs and technological feasibility only once an "accep  able risk'  level had been
achieved.
The simplest way in which to incorporate the Vinyl  Chlorid  ruling into the model  is
to add to the utility function a term that interacts costs with a dummy variable that is equal to
1 if a regulation  was issued  after 1987. The effect  of costs after 1987  is then the sum of the two
cost coefficients. When the extra cost variable is added to the multinomial  logit model  (column
2 of Table 7), the level of significance .f each cost variable  is reduced  compared  to the original
equation; however, both are marginally significant. The null hypothesis  that the sum of the
coefficients  is zero, i.e., that costs were not considered  after 1987, cannot  be rejected  at the .05
level.
The  inyjl  Chloride  decision  thus appears  to have had the desired effect on the setting
of subsequent  NESHAPs. To illustrate  the magnitude  of the effect, we note that the value per
cancer case avoided implied by regulations  prior to  1987 is $15 million, whereas it is $194
million fcr regulations  issued  after the decision.
Allowing the Yinyl  Chloride decision to alter the weight attached to costs does not,
however, capture the "acceptable  risk" component  of the court's ruling. According  to the court,
costs were to be ignored  only when  individual  risk was unacceptably  high. The dummy  variable
interacted with costs should therefore equal 1 after 1987 only if  option  i  would reduce
Maximum  Individual  Risk from a level that is unacceptably  high.
'4Natural  Resources  Defense  Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1146 (1987)21
The effects  of modifying  the Yin! Chlorid dummy  in this fashion  appear  in column
3 of Table 7.  Statistically,  the results  are superior  to a simple  time dummy.  Both cost
variables,  and the reduction  in cancer incidence,  are significantly  different from zero at
conventional  levels. The  results  imply  that  a cancer  case  avoided  is valued  at approximately  $15
million  (1989  dollar)  before the 1987 court decision  and  1  aaml=  yi  aflue  so long as
maximum  incividual  risk is below 1 in 10,000. After 1987,  however,  if MIR  was above  1 in
10,000,  then EPA  di,i not consider  costs  at all-the sum  of the cost  coefficients  in column  3 is
not significantly  different  from zero."5
V.  Conclusions
Perhaps  the most  striling  fins,  \ng  of our analysis  is that, for all regulations  examined,
benefit  and cost  considerations  alone  explain  at least 85 percent  of the decisions  issued. EPA
thus  behaved  as though  it considered  btaeefits  and  costs  in issuing  regulations,  even  when  costs
were not to be considered  in standard  setting. The weights  attached  to benefits  and costs,
however,  imply  that  EPA  has been  willing  to have  consumers  and firms  incur  substantial  costs
to save  one statistical  life.  Under  the two balancing  statutes-TSCA  and FIFRA--the  implicit
value  per cancer  case  avoided  is in excess  of $45 million  (1989  dollars). An important  question
is whether  members  of society  agree with this valuation.  Compensation  for the loss of one
statistical  life  in the workplace  is about  one-tenth  of the value  implicit  in the TSCA  and FRA
regulations  examined  here.  Compensation  for workplace  risks, however,  is for voluntary
'5A test  of the null hypothesis  that the sum  of the cost  coefficients  in column  3 is
significantly  different  from  zero can  be rejected  at only  the 0.11 significance  levd.22
exposure  to immediate  risk pf death. Exposure  to pesticides  and asbestos  may not be voluntary
(even for workers) if people are unaware  of the risks that result from exposure.
It is also interesting  to note that EPA has implicitly  attached  more weight  to saving  the
lives of those who are occupationally  exposed  to pesticides  and asbestos  than to saving  the lives
of consumers. One reason for this may  be that workers, on average, receive much  larger doses
of pollution than do consumers.  In the case of pesticides,  for example, the median lifetime
cancer risk frorp pesticide  exposure is one in 1,000 for applicators  but only one in 100 million
for consumers  of pesticide  residues  on food.  On the other hand, to the extent  that workers  may
already receive compensating  wage differentials  for exposure to pollution, the larger weight
attached by EPA to saving their lives may not be justified.
Turning  to emissions  standards  for hazardous  air pollutants,  it is interesting  to note that
the implied  value per cancer case avoided  associated  with these regulations  prior to 1987  is only
$15 million  (1989 dollars)--less  than half the value implied  by pesticide  or asbestos  regulations.
After the 1987 jnv  Chloride  decision,  however, which  admonished  EPA not to consider  costs
unless  an acceptable  level of risk to the MEI had been  achieved,  this value  jumped to over $200
million  (1989  dollars). This raises  the question: Do balancing  statutes  realiy  make a difference?
Our analysis of the setting of the NESHAPs suggests that--short of recourse to the courts--
prohibitions  against  considering  costs are difficult  to enforce. Likewise, Congress  may require
that the costs of a regulation  be balanced  against  the benefits,  but, as long as EPA has discretion
in the weights  it assigns to costs and benefits, regulations  issued under balancing  statutes may
still be very costly.23
Table 1.  Costs and Benefits of Banning Asbestos
Gross Total  Cancer  Cost Per Cancer
Product Description  Loss  Cases  Case Avoided
(mil. 1989  $)  Avoided  (mu. 1989  $)
PRODUCTS BANNED
Drum Brake Linings  (A/M)  13.87  136.3872  0.10
Brake Blocks  2.82  12.9784  0.22
Disc Brake Pads LMV (Aftermarket)  5.69  23.2356  0.24
Pipeline  Wrap  0.55  1.1196  0.49
Specialty  Paper  0.02  0.0330  0.61
Drum Brake Linings  (OEM)  7.18  7.6476  0.94
A/C Sheet, Corrugated  0.15  0.0923  1.63
Disc Brake Pads HV  0.32  0.1948  1.64
A/C Sheet, Flat  1.72  0.6752  2.55
Disc Brake Pads LMV (OEM)  3.49  0.9063  3.85
Roofing  Felt  4.04  0.9717  4.16
Friction  Materials  2.06  0.4719  4.37
Non-Roofing  Coatings  2.27  0.3833  5.92
Millboard  5.16  0.7399  6.97
Beater-Add  Gaskets  97.94  5.9344  16.50
Clutch  Facings  10.93  0.5444  20.08
Roof Coatings  75.63  1.9134  39.53
Sheet Gaskets  85.69  1.9973  42.90
A/C  Pipe  178.53  3.9999  44.63
A/C Shingles  31.66  0.4111  77.01
Automatic  Transmission  Components  0.20  0.0004  500.00






PRODUCTS  NOT BANNED
Asbestos  Packing  0.49  0.0114  42.98
Beater-Add  Gaskets/2  50.45  1.0472  48.18
Asbestos-Reinforced  Plastics  40.58  0.6570  61.77
High Grade Electrical  Paper  58.79  0.5107  115.12
Sheet GasketslPFE  31.69  0.2219  142.81
Asbestos  Thread, Yarn, etc.  159.15  0.6222  255.79
Sealant  Tape  41.19  0.1115  369.42
Acetylene  Cylinders  0.08  0.00003  2666.67
Missile  Liner  1001.67  0.3161  3168.84
Asbestos  Diaphragms  2314.75  0.2140  10816.59
Battery  Separators
Arc Chutes24
Table 2.  Factors Affecting the Probability that Asbestos Is Banned
Variable Name  (1)  (2)
Intercept  0.31  0.07
(0.63)^  (0.12)
Gross Total Lossb  -0.099  -0.17
(-2.03)  (-1.44)
Cancer Incidence  Reduction  (No. of Cases)  4.85
(2.15)
Occupational  Cancer Incidence  Reduction  11.76
(1.43)
Nonoccupational  Cancer Incidence  Reduction  5.69
(1.43)
Log Likelihood  -6.42  -4.91
Percentage  of decisions  correctly predicted  87.0  87.0
Implicit value of a cancer case avoidedb  48.61
(36.66, 60.55]'
Based on non-occupational  exposure  34.39
[6.96, 61.82]
Based on occupational  exposure  71.01
[12.83, 129.19]
'Numbers in parentheses  are t-statisties
'Millions of 1989 dollars
'Numbers in brackets are endpoints  ot a 95 percent confidence  interval25
Table 3.  Active Ingredients In the Pesticide Database.
DBCP  1978  12  1  12
Amitraz  1979  2  1  1
Chlorobenzilate  1979  3  2  2
Endrin  1979  8  4  4
Pronamide  1979  4  0  0
Dimethoate  1980  25  0  0
Benomyl  1982  26  0  0
Diallate  1982  10  10  0
Oxyfluorfen  1982  3  0  0
Toxaphene  1982  11  7  7
Trifluralin  1982  25  0  0
EDB  1983  18  4  18
Ethalfluralin  1983  3  0  0
Undane  1983  8  7  0
Silvex  1985  6  6  6
2,4,5-T  1985  2  2  2
Dicofol  1986  4  4  0
Alachlor  1987  10  3  0
Captan  1989  C  fi  A
Totals  245  116  9626
Table  4.  Means and Standard Deviations  of Variables Used in Pestkide Model
Uses that Were Banned  Uses twat  Were Not Banned
Variable  Name  No. of  Standard  No. of  Standard
Observations  Mean  Deviation  Observations  Mean  Deviation
Whete  Cancelled  96  1.0  0.0  149  0.0  0.0
Dktary Rislk  78  9.6E-4  3.5E-3  94  4.2E-6  1.4E-5
Applcator
Risk  63  1.2E-2  2.1E-2  66  1.5E-4  7.3E-4
Mixer Risk  42  2.2E-4  8.8E-4  35  1.2E-5  9.9E-6
Producer
BeC.fite  86  2.943  7.604  81  15.697  41.448
Whther
Yield Loss  96  0.240  0.430  149  0.530  0.501
Reproductive  Effects  96  0.917  0.278  149  0.517  0.501
Danga to
Marine  life  96  0.583  0.496  149  0.470  0.501
'All risks are rid  of cancer based on a lifetime  of exposure  to the pesticide.
bMillions of  1986 doLuars.27
Table 5.  Factors Affecting the Probability that a Pesticide Is Banned
Variable Name  (1)  (2)
Intercept  -1.493  -0.818
(-3.016)'  (-1.396)
Diet risk per million  persons  2.4E-3  -0.022
(0.668)  (-0.939)
Diet risk missing  -0.733  -0.697
(-2.153)  (-2.036)
Applicator  risk per million  persons  5.6E-4  5.4E-4
(2.406)  (2.268)
Applicator  risk missing  -0.146  -0.222
(-0.309)  (0.482)
Mixer risk per million  persons  0.003  -0.052
(0.391)  (-1.957)
Mixer risk missing  0.251  -0.257
(0.499)  (-0.452)
Producer benefitse  -0.043  -0.045
(-2.189)  (-2.168)
Producer benefits missing x  yield loss  -2.073  -2.153
(-5.513)  (-5.455)
Producer benefits missing x  no yield loss  -1.941  -1.870
(-4.212)  (-4.049)
Reproductive  effects  2.025  2.182
(4.706)  (4.999)
Danger to marine life  0.251  -0.096
(0.833)  (-0.299)
R.diet  1.7E-4
R.applicator  1.  1  E-2
R..mixer/loader  3. 1E-5
Log likelihood  -73.6  -69.7
Percentage  of decisions  correctly predicted  86.0  87.3
'Numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics
"Millions  of 1986 dollars28
Table 6.  Regulatory  Alternatives  for Sources of Hazarious Air Pollutants
Option  MWMUiM  Annual
Choon  Individual  Cancer  Cost
Sourc  Substance  (-  1)  Year  Risk (x ioo0)  Incidence  (Mil. 89S)
Beaune  trasfer  opertions  benzene  0  90  6  1  0
1  90  0.04  0.02  32.7
0  90  0.007  0.009  37.06
Bulk  soliun tmnals  bnzene  1  90  0.0S  0.12  0
0  90  0.01  0.08  57.12
0  90  0.006  0.08  142.8
Bulk gasoline plants  benzene  1  90  0.01  0.03  0
0  90  0.002  0.02  38.08
0  90  0.001  0.01  41.65
Service ttion  storge  vessel  benrene  1  90  0.0W5  0.13  0
0  90  0.0002  0.06  58.31
0  90  0.0002  0.05  238
Benze  waste opertions  ben-ne  0  90  2  0.6  0
1  90  0.05  0.05  98.31
Rubber tire manufactuing  benzene  1  90  0.004  0.0006  0
(ISU) benzene  0  90  0.001  0.0003  '4.74
Pharmaceutical  manufacturing  benzene  1  90  0.001  0.001  0
(ISU)  0  90  0.00004  0  0.13
Chemical manufactuing  benzene  1  90  0.04  0.01  0
process vents  0  90  0.01  0.008  3.33
0  90  0.001  0.0004  46.41
DepL of Energy (DOE) facilities  rdionuclides  1  89  0.2  0.28  0
0  89  0.1  0.25  0.2
NRC-licensed  & Non-DOE facilities  adionucides  1  89  0.16  0.16  0
0  89  0.1  0. 1S99  2.4
UraLium fuel cycle facilities  radionuclides  1  89  0.1S  0.1  0
0  89  0.03  0.0999  31
Elemental pbospborous  plants  adionuclides  0  89  0.57  0.072  0
1  89  0.1  0.024  2.4
0  89  0.01  0.002  22.4
Coal-fired utility boilers  radionuclides  1  89  0.025  0.4  0
0  89  0.0001  0.2  440029
Table 6 (continued)
Option  M  um  Annual
Chosn  Individual  Cancer  Cost
Sourc  Substance  (-1)  YOsr  Risk (a  0oo0) Ieidence  (Mi. 39S)
Coal-fired  industrial  boilers  mdionuclides  1  89  0.007  0.4  0
0  89  0.001  0.2  1700
Radon  relees  from DOE  facilities  radionuclides  0  89  1.4  0.072  0
1  89  0.18  0.04  1.5
0  89  0.1  0.012  2.8
Phosphogypsum  sacks  rdionuclides  1  89  0.091  0.9S  0
0  89  0.082  0.79  43
Underground  umaium  mines  rdionuclides  0  89  4.4  0.79  0
1  89  0.3  0.24  0.4
o  89  0.1  0.09  0.8
Surface  uranium  mines  radionucides  1  89  0.048  0.026  0
0  89  0.024  0.0038  0.8
Operating  uranium  mill  tailings  mdionuclides  0  89  0.16  0.014  0
1  89  0.09  0.009  0.5
Disposal  of urnium mill  tailings  piles  radionuclides  1  89  0.3  0.07  0
0  89  0.087  0.026  16
Ethylbnzen/Styrone  process  vents  benzene  1  89  0.02  0.003  0
0  89  0.01  0.001  0.26
Benzeno  storage  vessels  be-zene  0  89  0.13  0.071  0
1  89  0.03  0.04  0.13
0  89  0.03  0.03  1.67
Coke  by-product  reovery plants  benzne  0  89  7  2  0
1  39  0.2  0.05  19.04
0  89  0.2  0.03  26.18
Bezen. equipmnt leaks  benzea  1  39  0.1  0.2  0
0  89  0.03  0.1  8*6
Primary  copper  amllars  anie  0  86  1.3  0.38  0
1  86  1.3  0.29  0.49
0  U  1.2  0.2427  37.35
0  36  1.2  0.2399  42.3330
Table 6 (continued)
Option  Maximum  Annual
Chosen  Individual  Cancer  Cost
Source  Substance  (-1)  Year  Risk (x  0ooo)  Incidence  (mu. 89$)
Glas  manufachning plants  Arsenic  0  86  0.9  0.4  0
1  86  0.17  0.07  4.07
0  86  1.2  0.2307  78.69
Secondary  load plants  asenic  1  86  0.4  0.39  0
0  86  n.a.  0.13  18.22
Elemental  phospborous  radionucides  1  84  1  0.058  0
0  4  0.5  0.049  0.83
0  84  0.1  0.023  2.92
0  84  0.1  0.017  3.45
Coal-fired  utility boilen  radionuclides  1  84  0.01  1.4  0
0  84  n.s.  0.4  4352
Coal-fired industrial  boilers  rdionuclides  1  84  0.001  1  0
0  84  n.a.  0.7  704
0  84  U.s.  0.6  934.4
Malcic azrydride plants  benzene  1  S4  0.076  0.029  0
0  84  0.011  0.025  0.75
Benzeae  fugitive emissions  benzene  0  82  1.46  0.45  0
(existing)  1  82  0.45  0.14  0.68
0  82  0.42  0.126  6.32
Benzene  fugitive emissions (new)  benzene  0  82  1.46  0.12  0
1  82  0.45  0.038  0.17
0  82  0.42  0.035  1.54
EDCNVC  and PVC plants  vinyl chloride  0  75  4.86  11  0
1  75  n.s.  0.5S  149.131
Table 7.  Factors Affecting Choice of a National EmisIons Standard  for
Hazardous Air Polutants
Variable  Name  (1)  (2)  (3)
Reduction  in cancer incidence  9.93  21.64  21.67
(1.87)'  (2.28)  (2.07)
Increase in annual costb  -0.065  -1.33  1.47
(-2.36)  (-1.60)  (-1.96)
Increase in annual cost*post 1987  dummy  1.22
(1.53)
Increase  in annual cost*post 1987  dummy  1.37
*MIR >  .0001 dummy  (1.96)
Log likelihood  -18.84  -14.54  -11.77
Percentage  of decisions  correctly predicted  74.0  82.0  91.0
Implied  value of a cancer case avoidedb
1975  - 1990  152.64
[52.07, 252.94]c
1975  - 1987  16.2  14.73
[2.22, 30.2]  [10.6, 18.84]
1987 - 1990  194.06  216.70
[123.93, 264.19] (80.12,353,32]
'Numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics
bMillions  of 1989 dollars
CNumbers  in brackets are endpoints  of a 95 percent confidence  intervalFigure 1.  Cost-effectiveness  of Asbestos  Ban
Cost vs. Cancer  Cases Avoided
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